Chappie

Human consciousness has traditionally been defined as an essence, or a form; a spiritual correlate of a material body; and more recently as "something" beyond data, something that cannot be accounted for by materiality. In this sense it is best understood as residual. Residual being captures three metaphysical distinctions. 

We have received this distinction by another name: mind and matter. Mind things are of the order of "things" that can imagine Pegasus, say; whereas bodily things (the sensory apparatus, which is an interconnected neural relationship between nerves endings, and pathways in the brain), will, short of an hallucination, never verify the image combined (presumably) from a set of previous verifications. Material substance is not immaterial substance; and not everything is one substance. 

We late moderns take it for granted that this distinction is without use. Personally, I took it for granted that the mind was illusory, or at best something unnecessary in explanation. If we can explain morals by way of evolutionary hypothesis, for instance; if we can explain empathy by self-interest, say, then what is the point of the posit? What makes us human doesn't seem like the kind of thing that we have to worry about, if the explanandum has been robbed of the need for an explanans. But an impression managing psychopath is not the real McCoy, precisely because we, on the anti-material side of things, refuse to admit that the spiritual is reducible. Being genuine; being a truth teller, runs counterintuitively to calculation and self-interest. 

Of course, everyone knows that self-interest is not easily distinguishable from empathy, as though the latter were a matter of capping off the former. Why? Because it makes sense to ask: Is there value is doing X, whatever the X. Obviously, the realist point that one might value even self- destruction, say in refusing to lie to save oneself, is well intended; and yet, the question: but don't you do that for some kind of reward, is always on the table. Why? Because we take it for granted that we do things for a reason. 

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Consciousness, however, does still pique an interest. I recently watched Chappie, a story about a robot that has been given consciousness and then learns how to download consciousness into a data form, with the final result being that one need not "go to the next world" because "one would thereby become fully living cyborg, and, you guessed it, "live immortally". If consciousness can be conceived as data, albeit very complicated data, then the life hereafter is unnecessary. We have then another distinction: the living and the dead. Data is dead; humans are alive; chappie is the living dead; and Deon becomes the living dead too. Of course, the cyborg promise is that our body parts are replaceable, for a fee, of course, if you can't just steal it. 

There is another traditional distinction caught up in Chappie. That is the worry of freedom versus determinism.  Humans are free; Machines are bound by obligation and rule; they are programmed. Determinism is programming, whether from the Maker on high or some less than cosmic maker in the lab. Freedom is precisely what the buffoon played by Hugh Jackman did not have: the capacity to arrest the desire to do ill will, or to calculate motives. 

So there you have it: mind and matter; freedom and determinism; self-interest and morality; life and death. It is because this movie reaches far into these distinctions that it tends to appeal. 

And yet, I am a little less convinced by the premise that these enduring questions can be satisfied by a simplistic middle ground analogy. 

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Obviously the idea that a machine can have consciousness is about as ridiculous as believing that Pegasus is real. And it's not that this is due to the fact that I have religious ideals that I wish to protect from science. It is that these ideas are not well grounded by scientific measure; they are not the kinds of thing that permit analysis by empirical tools. This is a debate that goes back to Descartes, Hume, Kant and the medievals. It didn't get sorted then, and it's now no longer on the table, after 200 and some odd years of empirical investigation. And yet, after all that, it seems to have found an audience. It may very well be the case that we have anxiety about the idea of humans being replaced, outlined in ways above; but these anxieties stem from a common perception of time passed; one that cannot be easily answered without traceable echoes. 

Yes, the Hugh Jackman character is a buffoon. No he isn't bound to act viciously. Yes a machine follows orders. No we do not. Our freedom is residual; minds are residual. 

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Inventing a middle ground between humans and machines doesn't answer anything we are asking; it occludes an old memory, a set of three distinctions that must be articulated and which will always trouble. We still have the same anxieties, only we have a new set of permissible answers. But those anxieties are going nowhere because technology is not in the business of solving problems as much as it offers itself as a distraction. And so we trace them back, and so we profane.  

Marx and the Eschaton

To suppose that Christ doesn't have anything to do with marxist eschatology is to fail to understand the spirit of the age; it is to fail to grasp the point that Hegel and Marx were both upon; speaking, as they were, in an essentially jewish register. 

It was this same register that propelled the disciple and later apostle Peter to slice the ear off the servant alongside Judas in the Garden of Gethsemane; this same individual that wanted to reject the purpose Jesus had. In an ironic moment, in nearly the same sentence, Peter proclaims that Jesus is messiah, and yet denies that Jesus must die; a statement to which Jesus replies: "get behind me Satan". How could one be both understanding and yet so blind? It wouldn't be impossible to read this misunderstanding back into the prophetic works.

Throughout the prophets of the Old testament the promise is that the messiah will release the captives, set the oppressed free; we read this over and over, and yet always with the caveat that this will be a matter of being led by the messiah. And thus, it is not impossible that the same narrative plays in the reality of the Marxist eschaton. We must produce the kingdom of God now (utopia), the new world we have in our hearts. But this position is set in opposition to the desire that messiah has for us; messiah will lead us to greener pastures, while "we all, like sheep, have gone astray." The difference here is subtle: As messiah leads I am made blind to my own. 

Peter was led astray in the garden because, being a Zealot, he expected messiah to lead him and the people of Israel out of political captivity, which is not without truth in the prophets. But messiah never came to release the captives from whatever we pridefully despise; his release includes the denial of self, because it was the selfish eschaton that stole from God's retribution. Retribution (vengeance) is mine, saith the Lord. Thus, can we understand what this looks like? or is that already to desire vision (and so, sin?) (John 9)

It is partially because this position is ambiguous that we might say there is difficulty. God supports the release; it is talked about throughout Isaiah and Jeremiah; but this release on our terms, is already a failure of self. Whatever the release might become is not on our terms. Perhaps all of it might be read back into the parable of the weeds, which grow alongside the wheat until judgement/harvest. 

To say that God supports whatever we do is to fail to understand prophetic warning. Thus the justice of God cannot be conclusively rallied as support for any world system: socialist, communist, capitalist, or whatever. Any effort to mimic will already fail to address prophetic warning. The God of the old testament led his people himself. 

Will we wager then and hope that what we produce is analogous to the dictates of God, short of being led? Maybe we wonder what it's like to be led?

Indexed Offense.

The idea of partitioned groups of individuals that consent to marry other individuals of their race, doesn’t strike me as something that is morally repugnant; but that’s because there’s nothing that’s morally repugnant, unless one can give a reason. Want of a reason is the trouble. What is usually given is a loose conception of a neatly packaged symbolic reality. And only if you buy into the desires of others.

Reform for individuals tracks a propulsion that anarchists ought to reject. Nothing about reform (better) produces the overthrowing of the system. It is only the overthrow of that system itself that produces whatever, which has nothing to do with the best of the betters. The state will never give us what anarchists want. Therefore, liberal politics, cannot. Etc.,

Being white has at least two senses that need to be discussed: White people in the post-structural sense has to do with being of the ruling class. If being white (this body has the property of being-white) is necessary for rule, we cannot explain how black bodies are in power; if it is sufficient, we cannot explain how many whites do not have any ruling power. Since this is the case, the connection between whiteness and ruling as “the white man” is tenuous, and evidently rhetorical: There is nothing necessary about being white that produces the reality of ruling. The sense of the association comes out a bit more exactly as: whiteness in the ruling sense propels a set of likely potentialities on individuals with white bodies. Ruling propels, however, onto many bodies that aren’t white. Obviously. Therefore, either we affirm that ruling per se is not white; or else, we say, as I’ve said before, that Obama passes (performs) as a white person.

The anarchist tendency is to reject ruling because ruling over people is garbage. If whiteness is synonymous with ruling, then only Marxists are white. Only collectivists are white. Lots of black bodies are white. Everyone should rule together (impossible), or mind to themselves. No human should rule any other. 

The problem of being white is not an individualist's problem.