The politics of dispossession

Leftists tend to presume that we are entitled to a piece of the pie, a product of theft from other animal peoples, curiously justified as better if tending towards reproductive futurism. Right wing fucks suppose that one is entitled to the fruits of state-given properties, thieved, of course, via imperialism and genocide, and passed along as accumulated capital that one is hardly entitled to. None of this is play--the billionaire playboy mocks the term 'play', and the leftist only dreams of vacation (which is getting ready for work), and if not, pathetically, they dream of job satisfaction.

What interests me is the way in which leftwing rhetoric articulates that we simply must struggle for pie; and that the theft of civileges constitutes a reason for struggle. But what if we undervalue ascension in civilization, indeed, cut it down, and accept the removal of our dependencies? Part of the problem is surely that we value the things we are trained to value by the left. But what if we take back value, per se, and transvalue progress? What if we forget the commune, forget the enlightenment promise, and advocate for the destruction of civilege? Is the state then doing us a favour when we can no longer count on it to save us with handouts?

Anyone that has carried on the ridiculous desire of gaining degrees comes to terms eventually with student politics. In any event, it is presently argued that it is just unfair that TA's don't make the kind of money TA's once did; that it's unfair that temporary work has come to be the rule (not the exception) in all areas on the dying parasite host that is leviathan. We say so be it. We affirm that it is precisely when fascism shows up that people are readied and enabled to attack; that civileges being taken permits us to take back our lives from working for others. It positions us to simply play. Play seems best, in my opinion, when one's hand is forced, when one has no other option. Hence, play doesn't follow privilege; for it has nothing to do with it; and it might be, by definition, impossibly productive--and so, impossibly recuperated.

The TA's trying to get more money, trying to fit (rectudio) with reproductive futurism, fail to realize that none of us have any future; that capitalism is a fixed game privileging accumulated capital, and that none of us can have anything but scraps of fruit and crust from the already eaten pie. Even the jejune effort of anarcho-syndicalists to occupy and replace bosses at work with workers as bosses, fails to address how late into capitalism we actually are. Every functioning consumption apparatus must be occupied so that one's anarcho-syndicalist productivity cannot be ignored with new flows of already existing capital.--Sounds free right? Like a fence?

The left says that the right wants us to be individualized so that we cannot take back anything. But atomization is better than the false truth that collectivity is rewarding; for from the place of precariousness one can see for themselves if they are worthy of life, in the truest qualitative sense, very much and obviously opposed to purchasing life from the store.--Maybe we can see for ourselves the law of decomposition: If you can't truck it in the wild, maybe it's time to lay down and die. Of course from the place of oneself, one can find others beyond the masks of identity politics; one can feel precarity and act with purpose with true others--not allies. Both the left and the right offer us nothing but a down-going line of flight, an up-going ascent of civilege. Their trajectory is boring as fuck. Ours cannot be.

What's the Point?

How can we have hope in general when so much, including our own potential demands, weigh against the possibility of hope for security, stability, love, and all that?

Postmodern nihilistic thinking is often maligned for failing to be sufficiently interested in anything. If capitalism recomposes ad infinitum, only to stop itself short because that which was being used has finally been used up completely, what's the ultimate point in combating this reality of decompostion/recomposition? We are marching towards begin-used-up-completely; so, it would seem simple enough, because absolutely negative, that the point is to be living-useless. Obviously this is the category of politico-aesthetic revolt, depending on what we mean by this qualitative difference; and hence, what this means isn't mine to say for anyone else (and maybe even for myself to come). 

Those that malign postmodern thinking shouldn't malign them on this score, for seeing the hard truth, that is to say; they ought to malign them for failing to see that one can be a different kind of monster over and against being the monstrosity that is consumption-work-death-life. This is the thin line between pessimism and nihilism; and once we distinguish the truth that nothing matters, that history is hardly progressive, since it is merely a really good trick, etc., we individuals might be open to possibility--active, passive or otherwise.

In combating this reality, at best, an analogous microcosm of the microcosmic indifferent universe, Irony is taken to be reasonable. How can anything be taken seriously given a long view? This position, politically narrowed, concerns not the question of how anything can be taken seriously at all, but rather, given the problem of other people, how can a positive project be taken seriously? In Derrida's terms, or at least some of them, our projects will always crumble (autodeconstruct), because nothing but our positing these values, and 'holding' them--and therefore holding that which is Wholly Other at bay--keep them alive. But that which is Wholly Other has a claim on existence too.--And not just a potential claim! The uncanny, freakish, and monstrous elements of our worst fears already exist in other worlds, in the margins. 

Of course, this position follows as an opening. There are Wholly Others because we speak Law, as Agamben's anthropological machine suggests; for if law is a sorting device for good and evil, there will always be those that fit the place of the evil. But this is only a problem of naming. The fact that there are others outside of us that we malign by doing politics sets the tone for "deconstruction" of anything seemingly stable in the long view. What of the short view? Whose view? 

Being Ironic, from our position, is a humbling matter of realizing the limitation already upon our positive valuations. Everyday people may not care, other species surely do not; and then there's the unruly gang of nihilists (and/or queers, and/or individualists, and/or insurrectos) that continually frustrate anarcho-politicians via ironic laughter. Our question might be: How can we place upon ourselves final causes, if we can't even decide whether we will want what we have decided? And the answer might be, following the later Derrida: The long view is a tactic, a seeming ontological explanation. It is one that merely might be taken seriously. You See: Derrida was wise; he probably read Rorty and named his ontological principle (deconstruction) a quasi-transcendental, which is a fancy way of being agnostic about the metaphysics of the Real. Nevertheless, with Derrida's word as a tactic, the way is still open to follow Nietzsche: the proposition of Nihilism (Nothing matters) can be applied indifferently, it might be applied willy-nilly; and especially only if it pays. This is the right of its posit: since it is a posit, one need not be consistent about it.

Laughter itself, the ironic gesture, is only possibly a very serious matter because deconstruction was always a long view, something remote, and at that, something only possibly remote. Yet, still, one might laugh with the long view in mind. Alternatively, one might laugh the long view off. There are obviously options. There is a huge cavern between the pessimistic "nothing matters at all", and the nihilistic "Obviously this right here doesn't matter". The Pessimist gives herself a program; while the nihilist is iconoclastic, if useful.

Negative Pragmatics

One evident consequence of the wonderful text Hello is the general deflationary tone against obligation, a tone that seems partially originary in pragmatic accounts of truth. It is worth considering this position. Metaphysical truth has always been accounted for by an epistemological stance.

Getting the thing right, according to the way things really are would be the high standard of metaphysical truth; and it has always been met with confusion, perhaps in the order of a category mistake.

The subject object split is present in modern philosophy; yet its origin can certainly be found in medieval epistemologies. For instance, the subject(object) is not given in Aquinas, but is merely assumed to cohere with the phantasm, the final end of the movement of the thing in the senses, and that from which universals are abstracted and then put back onto the thing. In Aristotle, the active intellect becomes the universal of the thing, ceteris paribus. (Presumably this is done without violence to the thing. How might that work? The trick would be to not make the substance of knowledge an 'undergoing' and therefore an undergoing pushed back onto the thing. Rather, there is a mirroring stemming from the thing: its universal is recognized).

Aristotle's caution to listen to the thing, and what it permits, is of course a step in the right direction; and it would certainly be a guardrail against absurd imposition. But there is a lot of wiggle room. The deflationary point here, from an angle, is either that truth is not available because we cannot get beyond appearances; or, in a pragmatic articulation, that

P1 if truth doesn't depend on what we make of it

or

P2 If truth cannot depend on what we make of it

or

P3 if we can't even see truth anyways,

C1 truth doesn't make a difference to practice.

"Truth" would therefore be a useless concept; and then, false, if we define truth in terms of usefulness, would be here a matter of uselessness, such being truth's contrary.

Is truth given in P1-P3 available to us? Obviously not if our having it is impossible (P2). It is often said that truth doesn't depend on what we make of it; and similarly, by analogy, doing the right thing is right, no matter what. Hence--and this is the intuition surrounding truth--it might go against our desires.

So,

P4- Just as truth doesn't depend on how we feel about it, so too doing the right thing doesn't depend on how we feel about it. 

While it is irrelevant from the indifferent planetary perspective of truth (and so correct moral acts) per se if our desires line up (de Acosta, Green Nihilism or Cosmic Pessimism. ), doing the right thing may be something that we desire; and it may be something that we wish to have. Its being had is irrelevant to it; but our having it, may matter to us. Can we have it? Can we know? If we wish to have it, it makes a difference to our practice; if we cannot have it because our dispositions would be the substance of an improper medium, say because such can only be had by God, the latter would be our deflationary target. 

In another sense, the sense presupposed in reformist practice, we might say the truth does depend on us. What is the truth about climate change? One truth, certainly, is that the planet will be just fine, no matter what. For there will always be being. Now, of the beings that there are, perhaps we want to say that their being in the modes that they are, has to be addressed. Then their-truth does depend on what we make of them; they do depend on being seen in a better light. For instance, a chicken is certainly food for four; but how much more is the chicken? Getting things better functions in counter-propaganda. Does it move us out from a perspective of nature (wild, not yet exploited) to one of the anti-humyn (and any other thing else) planet? Not necessarily. But it certainly might move us out of the humyn-world perspective.

Getting the thing better, whatever the thing, is always a reformist project, especially to a degree; and the degree to which we are tending, the final form of the thing, is a true derivation of predicates that follow from it in every possible respect. If we are medieval epistemological reformists, we would say that we need to account for the thing in terms of its quantity, its many qualities, including habits, or any other undergoing, possible and actual, etc., Having an adequate account of the thing will be ultimately a matter of knowing the predicates of the thing, those that actually follow from the thing. Tall task; certainly one for a God. Certainly not for our Scientific gods; certainly not for us. 

Here is the issue. Truth and being true to a thing is a matter of constitution, the former fixing the latter. Being truer to a thing, depends then on knowing that one is tracking Truth. Or, alternatively, being truer to to a thing doesn't depend on Truth at all. The humyn socius cannot accept that the planetary perspective is indifferent. Hence, what is useful is a reformist concept that refers back to how we improve. Presumably those that make others be truer to them (A approaches B) either muddle with things (B), or not. Reform ultimately points the way to an Aristotlean epistemology outside of justice modified with the term 'social', therefore; for listening to the thing and what it permits, as though one were to host the thing, to actually approach it, rather than what we make of it, would be better if such is a matter of mattering to them, whereby they make our knowledge.

Now, let's just suss out a few more ideas. Another big important concept pertinent to de Acosta's piece on Desert and Dust is Being. What is 'being'? What does it mean for something to be? Presumably being is a necessary condition for truth. But everything that is, is; and everything that is becoming also is. What was, is-no-longer; what will be, is not-yet. There is then only that which is present. However, we can certainly have beliefs about events that are no more. Once true, always true. It is true that I went to the store yesterday. It is true that I am now writing this text. It may be true that I will meet some friends tonight. If so, then something makes the truth about those things true. Being true to something, on this score, is almost trivial. Getting to the essence, behind the accidents, is the thirst for Truth. I'm saying we can be true to something without worrying whether such will fit into an ultimate story only known by God. Of course triviality must, either way; for there is nothing about any future perspective that will negate these banalities, provided all goes well, and we keep up the good fight against those that would rewrite history. 

One might object here. Isn't truth univocal? Of course. We are only affirming 'truer to'; for we have deflated 'truth'. Hence, we are not equivocating, and we do not require the analogy here. What of 'truth' and 'being', however? Truth is just an isomorphic mode of being, a tracking. But every utterance or thought of truth is not nothing, but being. Whether being requires language is an open indeterminate question. Hence, being is analogous in itself and in truth. The being of truth is derivative and how it turns up (accidentally) is subsequent to how it is already, in its prior mode. The analogy we have in mind is one of attribution, then. That which is, is the first, always related to the accidental tracking of truth. The being of truth and the being of reality are different, yet one. Being as necessary indifferent, is, if so, quite indifferent to accidents of thought. And such is the planetary perspective, the demonic anti-humyn perspective.

Here are some summary thoughts.

1. Being, from the cosmic planetary perspective, doesn't depend on us. It just is, and language, humyn or divine, alien or animal, could be getting it right. But it's possible that we are failing in knowing essential respects. So, why bother? Since we have deflated this concept of truth, we leave it behind. But, it hasn't been left behind by those that would provide a story to bludgeon us. Essentialisms are alive and well (for now). If the universe doesn't give a shit about us, it's up to us to give a shit about ourselves. Yet, no one really gives a shit about anyone precisely because giving a shit negates distributive civilege in all its modes of domestication, which is always a destroying. What then is the value of the planetary perspective? It is this perspective that gives us strength to always push the envelope; to never see things as clear and crystal, but potentially something darker. It is the root of negation, but it is not nothing; it is an indifferent something that forever trivializes. It goes to work against others in their positive projects and it also potentially goes against us, until we are free because we do not need, because we have become its indifference, its armed subsequent thought. 

2. Dependency. Being doesn't need us. We are beings; but we don't need to be. We do not require being, then, but insofar as we are actual beings we cannot do without it in any sensible analysis. What of truths? Well clearly, we need truths to get around. And we need truths to get out from others and their efforts to control us. Or maybe we don't, if we don't care. So maybe truth doesn't matter to us. But in the trivial sense, it probably does to to a degree. To what degree does the trivial sense get us into a posture that is useful? The planetary perspective is literally the limit. How then do we get out from under the tent of passive nihilism? Two Qualifiers. Clearly we shouldn't have hope for the anarchist utopias to be realized. On the one hand, such would always be insufficient for us individuals; but more importantly, there doesn't seem to be any fucking way because there are a whole lot of sheeple in the way. People are fucked and they'll die for their civileges. Does this make us useless from a building a socialist utopia perspective? You bet! But does this mean we're just going to passively consume? Please. What are we to do? Something, Nothing, Whatever We Want (de Acosta). (Whatever our others permit us to get away with!) ("Rorty")

Various Nihilisms.

The Christian Bale Batman series is an excellent way of getting a handle on three strands of nihilism. These moments in film, therefore, tend to provide limits to what we can achieve; and in particular, guard rails for how we are to conceive of ourselves. Hopefully by running through these characters, in particular, Bane, Joker and Ra's Al-Ghul and the 'anarchist' defender Batman, we can get a picture of why nihilism is seen as so problematic. Contrary to contrary belief, Anarchism is Order, and Anarchy is Disorder. Therefore, we might say, Batman is a liberal anarchist, while the others play various anarchy roles, with Heath Ledger's Joker on the complete opposite of the spectrum.

According to Christian Bale, perhaps not an authority, but certainly a window into vigilante justice through the lens of the actor playing Batman, Batman has options:

For me he [Batman] is an anarchist and a free spirit. He knows that there are parallels between him and his enemies because life is never stable — you always have to fight for it. Keeping in mind that it may never be boring and that nobody is obliging you to behave like a superhero and to always have your muscles flexed and bulging."

We can see this freedom is generated against the lens of anti-civilizational fascism, in the battle between Ra's Al-Ghul's desire to burn the city to the ground--or at least give them some of their own medicine via Scarecrow and the fear-generating blue flower, which, if you'll recall, is used by the league of Shadows to overcome fear--and Batman's desire to hold space for the people of Gotham. We might then say that Ra's Al-Ghul was attempting to produce growth, however undesired in the (good) process of facing fears. This is a form of fascist healing very much on all fours with primitivist thought as being the last word on "reform", the negation to end all negations. It seems likely that this is desired in order to foster a new way of living, one against decadence, as "Ra's" sun filled light would generate life out of death. A new shell. And such seems pretty, lovely, but deeply fascist, from a freedom point of view. As I've tirelessly harped in other places: One is not free unless one has options to choose. Therefore both Batman (anarchist attempts to resuscitate Civ and generate true civilege) and Ra's Al-Ghul (new anti-civ beginnings) get the individual notion wrong: we are just particulars suffering consequences, and we need to be able to build our own world, or not, and thereby, be free to dissociate. 

On the opposite side, as antithetical within nihilism, with anti-civ destruction here as thesis, we have Joker; one that doesn't care about anything, and yet one that is very much interested in teaching others about immaterialism. Recall the lesson of the stolen money, burnt for the idiot criminals without a (power)ful perspective; a lesson which is then, in that reading, an effort to make one have money (Mammon), rather than be had by it. Perhaps Joker is saying against Bonnano that Qualitative Life has nothing to do with depending on money. In short, Joker doesn't care if Gotham reforms itself; he wants to prove that sheeple are irredeemable. So he sets up the boat-game, if you recall: If X and Y could kill each other, and it is likely that either will, the question is which group would do it first, the wealthy fucks, or the criminals. Obviously the criminals want to kill the rich--and why wouldn't they, these being perhaps 'the' source of their misery--and the wealthy fear death because then they might realize that everything they desire is completely meaningless, which ideally would demonstrate their true indifference. Joker generally represents whatever-being, indifferent cruelty, perhaps, but one with a bit of active-conscience. This motivation is more or less unclear, and isn't therefore exactly correct from the lips of Michael Caine, viz., that Joker just wants to see the world burn. There is more to the story which makes him just enough related (and so anti-thetical) to Ra's Al-Ghul. Perhaps he is saying that even if Gotham were to start over, there would still be all the crap that comes with civilization.  Neither the poor, nor the rich, ought to care about money; neither ought to rule. So Joker wants to bring the shell and its internals down, to burn it, so that anarchy might reign.

Bane is perhaps to be a synthesis, on this reading. He is an active marxist, forcing new conditions in the shell of the old. He is a nihilist, but of the right ilk in an anti-fascist register, given that he wishes to see the poor rise up and form a dictatorship (of the...). Yet, his position is absurd, perhaps because it is a synthesis of two poles: he would still bomb the whole damn thing, and not only if there is external rescuing, as the plans indicate. Batman checks out at this point, perhaps because it would seem impossible to do the right thing--give that this is better??; or perhaps, on the other hand, he leaves entirely because his right wing privilege would be taken apart by Bane.

Certainly more can be fruitfully said. And I hope you think it and carry this story on. But in the least we can ask ourselves: Whom do we wish to be like? Are we stuck in a synthesis? Are we reactionary and producing an antithesis? Or, are are we eclipsing both of these modes of negation, onwards and outwards? 

My Love.

Anarchy, by definition, implies 'anything goes' from an amoral point of view. Yet an ontological anarchy--a genuine anarchic existence--would be posterior to (and distinct from) the present conditions. However, what we mean here is merely different without conditions stretching everywhere. Conditions that eat into differences in order to return these modified bodies into The Same makes genuine difference impossible. What we wish for is a world in which difference is permitted to let be because everything has value. Importantly, the proposition that suggests not everything has value or, some morals are necessary is only permitted under this sign to be let be in its place. Folks should be free to dissociate if they wish to have no morals, or, more precisely, a morality of their own devising, just the same as they are free to dissociate from the rest to produce moral conditions they desire for themselves.

So imagine a series of circles that constitute the plane of reality. What we are saying for anarchy is that there wouldn't be an overriding circle that subsumes myriad circles; indeed, that there may be a circle that is so well defined (since anarchy is merely actualized possibility) that it could be imperialistic towards differences, in the sense that it wouldn't be surprising for it to so devolve. From within our present conditions, 'anything goes' only goes so far, and much of what is experienced precipitates the desire to produce inverted forced conditions. But we need not go so far, and we need not leave where we are. It is the belief that we should be permitted to go elsewhere and not experience different moralities that makes us imperialistic. Inverted conditions may indeed serve some purposes. But we want to invert the imperialistic process, not just the brand. We want to see folks find themselves, or even to find those that are comfortable with individuals being themselves.--And we feel nothing for those that do not wish to do the same. 

A pertinent issue here is the question concerning keeping to oneself. It is not that imperialism is bad because one thereby doesn't keep to oneself; it is not that imperialism is bad, more precisely; it is that there are only consequences. If one doesn't defend oneself against imperialists, perhaps one deserves their chains. Anarchy permits us to be concerned with defending ourselves from imperialism, and to lose hope in building a big happy world ruled by ideology, which functions according to imperialism and the making Same of wild amoral bodies. 

So we are once again advocating breaking away and building, so that we can defend ourselves when the time comes. To suppose that dissociation isn't our best trick is ultimately an effort to imperialize in a different register. We invert even the conditions of inversion until we can defend what we desire.

Natural As Fuck.

Nature is within and without us; for we are not fully domesticated, or so we should hope.
Yet, even though it makes little sense to distinguish nature and culture completely, given that what nature is is already overcoded by culture,  there is still that which is (and so could be) chaotic underneath the ontological crust that is domestication. We are technology to the degree that we depend on an apparatus that is civilization; so we must become our own tools; tools for being conduits of Being; tools for our own liberation, until we break free of ongoing domesticating culture.

Of course nature still exists. Those that are less affected by culture, at the limit, (and none can be completely "independent"--consider dioxin-everywhere) are those that we envision as moral exemplars; and for guidance we should choose those psuedo-domesticated animals that would take us away from the shitty; those that are clearly parasitic tools, but still with options. We could steal and live like parasites on a dying host; but can we, like raccoon, leave the shitty and find life? The raccoon, and the robin, the rabbit, and coyote, raven, crow and wolf; all of these are like ladders to climb towards Nature, the pure tool; completely in opposition (and prior) to technology. 

Nature is only like a perpetual motion machine, not just like, as if our imaginations were so boring; and there is nothing technological required. She is (perhaps) fully indifferent to our plight. She bats last and we shouldn't presume to know her batting record given that she has never had to step up to the plate. Nature has all sorts of processes that we might fruitfully refer to as technical processes, and letting her be, without interference, is to witness a production of beautiful perfection. How might we mimic this Art? Perhaps it starts from being with options, from being open to whatever becoming; to be in opposition to dependency; to become indifferent to expectancy.

We are suggesting that there is a world of difference between depending on X, as we technologies depend on civilization, and becoming independent of technology in becoming-tool. A mosquito, or a tree-persyn in a wild space is not dependent, but also not completely unaffected by humyn modification. If everything is connected, there is no purity--no Nature that isn't ontologically natureculture; but the ways that things are connected matters; and I'm insisting that there is a difference between dependence--technologies--and near complete indifference. Since nothing is unconnected to/unaffected by humyn scourge to some degree, we explain the intuitive difference between nature and culture by a difference about dependence and indifference. For us, dependent to a large degree, this is a matter of defection, in the sense that we ask: Does Civilization matter to us? Can we say that we do not need it? We are not yet fully indifferent because we are still dependent, and even if we could go without, we would still be affected.

Our ideal descent opposes civilege, and it isn't impractical. Our downgoing is a moral piggybacking on parasites with options. We wish to survive, by any and all means; and we are fully aware of the consequences of our choosing shitty life--for now. Could raccoon leave the shitty? Or has raccoon grown too fat off the host, thereby atrophying wild living? Perhaps some, but not all; like those that thirst for revolution and those that get paid to sell it out, we must eat the latter. Staying, defending, depending; all of this makes us restless, without genuine (qualitative) rest; leaving, traveling, opening to outpouring; all of this makes us thirsty for our own blood, that flows off us as we enliven our capacities without apparatus. 

Nihilisms

The movie Snowpiercer is an excellent hypothetical take on what is necessary for us addicted to anarchy to visualize in general, that is, for us to visualize in terms of reality-as-negation under capitalist constraints. 

You have to get out. 
There is no internal solution. 

This is of course obvious; but not for anarcho-syndicalists or other liberals, or at least not to the degree that we consider capitalistic technocratic colonialism of wild animal bodies to be in need of total destruction. Against Bonnano we say theft in quantitative conditions is only more quantitative reality--such is hardly qualitative because one here adheres to some kind of productive activity, fully exploitative and on the backs of others too weak to seek a way out of this variation of quantitative life. For the negation of the conditions of reality is only sufficient for us if we remove ourselves (individually and therefore (perhaps) collectively) from our parasitism.

The plot takes us on a cruise to the realization that even if you get to the top you have to accept its conditions and that it is fixed. 

The shell and its internals.  

There is no new in the shell of the old; only the shell with different content, generating similar appearances in both cases, whether capitalism or communism. And here the point is picturesque. Even if the train were to be more just; if, say, Curtis were to carry out Equality via task rotation--a little bit of injustice some of the time for everyone so that there is a just whole; if all of that, the train being as it is simply repeats what the world is like. And what is the world like? The persyn at the head is always a terrible nihilist, a cruel indifferent bastard producing conditions of chaos so that the whole might adapt to its own excrement; producing the deaths of some, usually the worst off, but not necessarily, so that the whole might be maintained in its "integrity". 

This is closer to home than most of us wish to see. 
It doesn't offer a way out. 
For we love to consume the shit that we produce, disregarding originary natural production for an apparatus of our own shit. 
We permit our dreams to be recuperated, if we have any at all. The way the world is, is conceived to be the best of all possible worlds; the train puts this (quantitative, domesticated) quality in the tight light that it really is.

In the end, the train is derailed and the two last "hopes" of humanity, whom had created this reality for themselves via a bomb, leave the dirt that is train-civilization, and embark on a new reality, fully external, fully Outside (the train). It is not clear why fur coats would all of a sudden be sufficient in ridiculously cold temperatures, temperatures that had been earlier marked by dead snow-humyns that had once escaped; but perhaps death is better than this life.... Perhaps there is an unspoken shift in reality that permits this move; perhaps, in a deeper register, these conditions are merely seemingly impossible and the entire point is allegorical. Clearly the explosion is not an act that destroys humanity (since two, perhaps more, survive). And since the avalanche wasn't intentional, the bomb exploding cannot be justifiably compared to the nihilism of Wilford, his revealed indifferent shrewd force as the man that runs the entire apparatus by way of a perpetual motion engine coupled to a young slave-child. The bomb is instead a persynal movement to shift ones' own reality, to create space Outside. 

This escaping-act is also importantly passive in the sense that these are kronos-addicts, neither rulers nor slaves, middle class privilege-keepers with some kind of access, yet with just enough knowledge to see this entire world as fucked. Anti-social nihilism here stands in subtle contrast to ruling nihilisms. The final scene depicts two persyns taking action to improve their own being; and with no-one to stand on in such a move, because the world has been left behind, that is to say, the direct link of exploitation has been completely negated, one is free from the obligation of giving a shit about anyone else but oneself and ones' friends and free from a sense that there is a degree to which mutual aid is caught under the sign of reciprocal use-value.

The point that I think Snowpiercer permits us to see is a  difference between nihilism in relation to ruling persyns and nihilism in relation to not falling for the need to overturn conditions, which can never be completely negated by the logic of rulership. That is to say, perhaps, if one fucks off from the conditions, one can be anti-social and simultaneously liberated from the obligation to other people and their needs.